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Abstract
As a certified defensive technique, randomized smoothing has received consider-
able attention due to its scalability to large datasets and neural networks. However,
several important questions remain unanswered, such as (i) whether the Gaussian
mechanism is an appropriate option for certifying `2-norm robustness, and (ii)
whether there is an appropriate randomized mechanism to certify `∞-norm robust-
ness on high-dimensional datasets. To shed light on these questions, we introduce
a generic framework that connects the existing frameworks in [1, 2] to assess ran-
domized mechanisms. Under our framework, we define the magnitude of the noise
required by a mechanism to certify a certain extent of robustness as the metric for
assessing the appropriateness of the mechanism. We also derive lower bounds on
the metric as the criteria for assessment. Assessment of Gaussian and Exponential
mechanisms is achieved by comparing the magnitude of noise needed by these
mechanisms and the criteria, and we conclude that the Gaussian mechanism is an
appropriate option to certify both `2-norm and `∞-norm robustness. The veracity
of our framework is verified by evaluations on CIFAR10 and ImageNet.
1 Introduction
The past decade has witnessed tremendous success of deep learning in handling various learning tasks
like image classification [3], natural language processing [4], and game playing [5]. Nevertheless, a
major unresolved issue of deep learning is its vulnerability to adversarial samples that are almost
indistinguishable from natural samples to humans but can mislead deep neural networks (DNNs) to
make wrong predictions with high confidence [6, 7]. This phenomenon, referred to as adversarial
attack, is considered to be one of the biggest threats to the deployment of many deep learning
systems. Thus, a great deal of effort has been devoted to developing defensive techniques against it.
However, the majority of the existing defenses are of heuristic nature (i.e., without any theoretical
guarantees), implying that they may be ineffective against stronger attacks. Recent work [8, 9, 10]
has confirmed this concern by showing that most of those heuristic defenses actually fail to defend
strong adaptive attacks. This forces us to shift our attention to certifiable defenses as they can classify
all the samples in a predefined neighborhood of the natural samples with a theoretically-guaranteed
error bound. Among all the existing certifiable defensive techniques, randomized smoothing is
becoming increasingly popular due to its scalability to large datasets and arbitrary networks. [1]
first relates adversarial robustness to differential privacy, and proves that adding noise is a certifiable
defense against adversarial perturbation. [2] connects adversarial robustness with the concept of
Rényi divergence, and improves the estimate on the lower bounds of the robust radii. Recently, [11]
successfully certifies 49% accuracy on the original ImageNet dataset under adversarial perturbations
with `2 norm less than 0.5.
Despite these successes, there are still several unanswered questions regarding randomized smoothing
mechanisms. One of such questions is, why we should use the Gaussian mechanism for randomized
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smoothing to certify `2-norm robustness, or, is there any mechanism more appropriate than Gaussian
mechanism? Another important question is regarding the ability of this method to certify `∞-norm
robustness. If randomized smoothing can be used to certify `∞-norm robustness, what mechanism
is an appropriate choice? All these questions motivate us to develop a framework to assess the
appropriateness of a randomized smoothing mechanism for certifying `p-norm robustness.
In this paper, we take a promising step towards answering the above questions by proposing a generic
and self-contained framework, which applies to different norms and connects the existing frameworks
in [1, 2], for assessing randomized mechanisms. Our framework employs the Maximal Relative Rényi
(MR) divergence as the probability distance measurement, and thus, the definition of robustness under
this measurement is named as DMR robustness. Under our framework, we define the magnitude of
the noise required by a mechanism to certify certain extent of robustness as the metric for assessing
the appropriateness of the mechanism. To be specific, a more “appropriate” randomized mechanism
under this definition refers to a mechanism that can certify certain extent of robustness with “less”
amount of noise. Given this definition, it is natural to define the assessment criteria as the lower
bounds on the magnitude of the noise required to certify `p robustness, in that we can judge whether
a mechanism is an appropriate option based on the gap between the magnitude of noise needed by
the mechanism and the lower bounds.
Inspired by the theories regarding the sample complexity of DP algorithms, we derive the lower
bounds on the noise required for certifying `2-norm or `∞-norm robustness. We demonstrate that the
Gaussian mechanism is an appropriate option by showing the gap between the required Gaussian
noise and the lower bounds is O(
√
log d), where d is the dimensionality of the data. This gap is small
for datasets like CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. We also show that the Exponential mechanism is not an
appropriate option since the gap scales in O(
√
d). All in all, our contribution is three-fold:
• We present a generic and self-contained framework for the assessment of randomized
smoothing mechanisms induced by a new definition of robustness, namely DMR robustness,
which connects the existing frameworks such as [1] and [2].
• We define a metric for assessing randomized mechanisms, i.e., the magnitude of the noise
required to certify robustness, and we derive the lower bounds on the magnitude of the noise
required to certify `2-norm and `∞-norm robustness as the criteria for the assessment.
• We assess the Gaussian mechanism and the Exponential mechanism based on the metric
and the lower bounds (criteria). Specifically, we compare the magnitude of the noise used in
the Gaussian and Exponential mechanism with our lower bounds to justify that the Gaussian
mechanism is an appropriate option for certifying both `2-norm and `∞-norm robustness.
2 Related Work
There are three approaches to certify adversarial robustness standing out recently. The first approach
formulates the task of adversarial verification as a non-convex optimization problem and solves it
by tools like convex relaxations and duality [12, 13, 14]. Given a convex set (usually an `∞ ball)
as input, the second approach maintains a convex outer approximation of all the possible outputs
at each layer by various techniques, such as interval bound propagation, hybrid zonotope, abstract
interpretations, and etc. [15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. The third approach uses randomized smoothing to certify
robustness, which is the main focus of this paper. Randomized smoothing for certifying robustness
becomes increasingly popular due to its strong scalability to large datasets and arbitrary networks
[1, 20, 11, 12, 21]. For this approach, [1] first proves that randomized smoothing can certify the `2
and `1-norm robustness using the differential privacy theory. [20] derives a tighter lower bound on the
`2-norm robust radius based on a lemma on Rényi divergence. [11] further obtains a tight guarantee
on the `2-norm robustness using the Neyman-Pearson lemma. [22] proposes a new framework based
on f-divergence that applies to different measures. [21] combines [11] with adversarial training, and
[23] extends the method in [11] to the top-k classification setting. We note that the method in [11]
is only applicable to the Gaussian mechanism in the `2-norm case since it requires isotropy, and
the frameworks proposed in [1, 2] are more general. In the following, we briefly review the basic
definitions and theorems in the frameworks of [1, 2], which helps us demonstrate the connections
between our framework and those two frameworks.
Our review begins with several definitions and notations. In general, we denote any randomized
mechanism byM(·), which outputs a random variable depending on the input. We represent any
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deterministic classifier that outputs a prediction label by f(·). A commonly-used randomized classifier
can be constructed by g(·) = f(M(·)). We denote a data sample and its ground-truth label by x and
y, respectively. A `p-norm ball centered at x with radius r is represented by Bp(x, r). We say a data
sample x′ is in the Bp(x, r) iff ‖x′−x ‖p ≤ r. Next, we can detail the frameworks in [1] and [2],
i.e., PixelDP and Rényi-Divergence-based Bound.
PixelDP PixelDP [1] is the first framework to prove that randomized smoothing is a certified
defense by connecting the concepts of adversarial robustness and differential privacy. The definition
of adversarial robustness in the framework of PixelDP can be stated as follows:
Definition 1 (PixelDP [1]) For any x, and x′ in the Bp(x, r), if a randomized mechanism M(·)
satisfies
∀S ⊆ O, P (M(x) ∈ S) ≤ eP (M(x′) ∈ S) + δ, (1)
where O denotes the output space ofM(·). Then we can sayM(·) is (, δ)-PixelDP.
[1] connects PixelDP with adversarial robustness by the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Robustness Condition [1]) Suppose G(·) is randomized K-class classifier defined by
G(x) = (G1(x), ...,GK(x)) that satisfies (, δ)-PixelDP (in Bp(x, r)). For the ground-truth class
k, if
E(Gk(x)) > e
2 max
i:i 6=k
E(Gi(x)) + (1 + e
)δ, (2)
then the classification result (E(G1(x)), ..., E(GK(x))) is robust in Bp(x, r), i.e., ∀x′ ∈ Bp(x, r),
argmaxiE(Gi(x
′)) = k.
Note that the definition of the randomized classifier G(·) is a little different from the definition of g(·)
since the output of g(·) is a scalar not a vector (prediction label). g(·) is more popular in the follow-up
works such as [2, 11]. [1] mainly utilizes two mechanisms, i.e., Laplace mechanism and Gaussian
mechanism, to guarantee PixelDP. Specifically, adding Laplace noise (i.e., p(z) = 12b exp− |z|b ) to
the data samples can certify (, 0)-PixelDP in B1(x, b) for any x, and adding Gaussian noise (i.e.,
p(z) = 1√
2piσ
exp− z22σ2 ) can certify (, δ)-PixelDP in B2(x, σ√2 log 1.25/δ ) for any x.
Rényi Divergence-based Bound [2] proves a tighter estimate (compared with [1]) on the lower
bound of robust radii based on the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Rényi Divergence Lemma [2]) Let P = (p1, p2, ..., pk) andQ = (q1, q2, ..., qk) be two
multi-nomial distributions. If the indices of the largest probabilities do not match on P and Q, then
the Rényi divergence between P and Q satisfies
Dα(P ||Q) ≥ − log(1− p(1) − p(2) + 2(1
2
(p1−α(1) + p
1−α
(2) ))
1
1−α ).
where p(1) and p(2) refer to the largest and the second largest probabilities in {pi}, respectively.
If the Gaussian mechanism is applied to certify `2-norm robustness, the estimate on the lower bound
of the robust radii can be given by the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Let f be any deterministic classifier and g(x) = f(x+ z) be its corresponding
randomized classifier for samples x ∈ Rd, where z ∼ N (0, σ2Id). Then ∀x′ ∈ Bp(x, r),
argmaxy P (g(x) = y) = argmaxy′ P (g(x
′) = y′), i.e., g(·) is robust in Bp(x, r), and the `2
robust radii r that could be certified is given by
r2 ≤ sup
α>1
−2σ
2
α
log(1− p(1) − p(2) + 2(1
2
(p1−α(1) + p
1−α
(2) ))
1
1−α ). (3)
p(1) and p(2) refer to the largest and the second largest probabilities in {pi}, where pi is the probability
that g(x) returns the i-th class, i.e., pi = P (g(x) = i).
3
3 Overview of Our Framework
In this section, we present a generic framework based on the Definition 2, 3, and 4, for assessing
randomized mechanisms. According to Definition 3, our framework applies to all `p-norms (actually
all measures). Moreover, we show that our proposed framework connects the existing general
frameworks in [1, 2] by Theorem 3.1 & 3.2. Also, we note that it is difficult to involve the framework
in [11] since [11] requires the additive noise to be isotropic like the Gaussian noise.
3.1 Main Definitions
Under our framework, the definition of adversarial robustness is induced by maximal relative Rényi
divergence (MR divergence), namely DMR robustness, so we start from introducing the definition of
MR divergence.
Definition 2 (Maximal Relative Rényi Divergence) The Maximal Relative Rényi Divergence
DMR(P‖Q) of distributions P and Q is defined as
DMR(P‖Q) = max
α∈(1,∞)
Dα(P‖Q)
α
(4)
Using DMR as the probability measure, we can define adversarial robustness as follows:
Definition 3 (DMR Robustness) A randomized smoothing mechanismM(·) is a (r,DMR, ‖·‖p, )-
robust mechanism if
∀x′ ∈ Bp(x, r),max{DMR(M(x),M(x′)), DMR(M(x′),M(x))} ≤ . (5)
If a randomized smoothing classifier g(·) satisfies the above equation, we can say it is a (r,DMR, ‖ ·
‖p, )-robust classifier or it certifies (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖p, )-robustness.
A property of DMR robustness we use throughout this paper is its postprocessing property, which
can be stated as follows:
Corollary 1 (Postprocessing Property) Let g(x) = f(M(x)) be a randomized classifier, where
f(·) is any deterministic function (classifier). g(·) is (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖, )-robust ifM(·) is (r,DMR, ‖ ·
‖, )-robust.
This postprocessing property can be easily proved by Dα(f(M(x))‖f(M(x′))) ≤
Dα(M(x)‖M(x′)) [24]. This property allows us to only concentrate on the randomized smoothing
mechanism M(·) without considering the specific form of the deterministic classifier f(·), and
therefore makes the framework applicable to an arbitrary neural network.
3.2 Connections between DMR robustness and the existing frameworks
The framework defined by Definition 2 & 3 is generic since it is closely connected with the existing
ones [1, 2]. Here we demonstrate the connections by the following two theorems.
Theorem 3.1 (DMR Robustness & PixelDP) IfA(·) is (r,DMR, ‖ ·‖p, )-robust, thenA(·) is also
(+ 2
√
log (1/δ), δ)-PixelDP.
We note that the opposite of Theorem 3.1 holds only when δ = 0, which indicates our framework
is a relaxed version of the PixelDP framework. But this should not be a surprise since most of
the following frameworks [2, 11, 22] can somehow be considered more relaxed than the PixelDP
framework and thus yield tighter certified bounds. Similarly, our framework can provide the same
bound on the robust radius as in [2], which is tighter than the bound in [1] (Theorem 3.2).
Theorem 3.2 (DMR Robustness & Rényi Divergence-based Bound) If a randomized classifier
g(·) is (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖p, )-robust, then ∀x′ ∈ Bp(x, r), argmaxy P (g(x) = y) =
argmaxy′ P (g(x
′) = y′) as long as
 ≤ sup
α>1
− 1
α
log(1− p(1) − p(2) + 2(1
2
(p1−α(1) + p
1−α
(2) ))
1
1−α ), (6)
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where p(1) and p(2) also refer to the largest and the second largest probabilities in {pi}, and pi is the
probability that g(x) returns the i-th class, i.e., pi = P (g(x) = i). Based on the above theorem, we
can derive the same `1 and `2 robust radius as in Lemma 3 [2]. We will detail how to derive the `2
robust radius in Section 4.
All the omitted proof is provided in the Appendix. An interpretation of Theorem 3.1 and 3.2 is that,
as long as we can use a randomized mechanism with a certain amount of noise to certify DMR
robustness, we can use the same mechanism with the same amount of noise to certify PixelDP and
the Rényi Divergence-based Bound. Thus, Theorem 3.1 and 3.2 indicate the assessment results based
on the metric defined in section 3.3 is very likely to generalize to the other frameworks.
3.3 Assessment of Randomized Mechanisms
Since there are infinite randomized mechanisms, the natural problem is to determine whether a certain
randomized mechanism is an appropriate option to certify adversarial robustness. However, we note
that all the previous work [2, 11, 21] overlook this problem and assume the Gaussian mechanism
to be an appropriate mechanism for certifying `2-norm robustness without sufficient assessment.
While in this paper, we attempt to provide a solution to this problem under our proposed framework.
Specifically, we define a metric to assess randomized mechanisms as follows:
Definition 4 Specify a p-norm, a robust radius r, and an epsilon , the magnitude (`∞-norm) of the
noise required by a randomized mechanismM(x) = x+ z to certify (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖p, )-robustness
is defined as the metric to assess the appropriateness ofM(·).
We define this metric for assessing randomized mechanisms because the accuracy of neural networks
tends to decrease as the magnitude of the noise added to the inputs increases. Note that if the
magnitude of the noise required for a randomized classifier is too large, the accuracy of its predictions
on clean samples might be very low, then robustness will be useless. Given the above metric, we also
need criteria to assess the (relative) appropriateness of a randomized mechanism. In this paper, we
employ the lower bounds on the magnitude of the noise required to certify certain (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖p, )-
robustness as the criteria. In the following, we will provide the lower bounds for p = 2 (`2-norm) and
p =∞ (`∞-norm), i.e., the two most popular norms, and assess the appropriateness of the Gaussian
and Exponential mechanisms for certifying `2-norm and `∞-norm robustness.
4 Assessing Mechanisms for Certifying `2-norm Robustness
In this section, we first elaborate on how the Gaussian mechanism certifies DMR robustness, and then
provide the lower bound on the magnitude of the noise required by all the randomized mechanisms
to certify `2-norm robustness. By comparing the magnitude of the noise required by the Gaussian
mechanism with the lower bound, we conclude that the Gaussian mechanism is an appropriate option
to certify `2-norm robustness.
Theorem 4.1 (Gaussian Mechanism for Certifying `2-norm robustness) Let f be any determin-
istic classifier and g(x) = f(x+ z) be its corresponding randomized classifier for samples x ∈ Rd,
where z ∼ N (0, σ2Id). Then, g(·) is (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖2, r22σ2 )-robust.
According to Theorem 3.2, if we substitute  with r
2
2σ2 , r can be given by r
2 ≤ supα>1 −
2σ2
α log (1− p1 − p2 + 2( 12 (p1−α1 + p1−α2 ))
1
1−α ), which is same as the bound in [2] (Lemma 3).
To provide a criterion for assessment of the Gaussian mechanism, we prove a lower bound on the
magnitude of the noise z required by any randomized smoothing mechanism M(x) = x+ z to
ensure thatM(x) (as well as f(M(x))) is (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖2, )-robust. If the magnitude of Gaussian
noise is close to the lower bound, then the Gaussian mechanism is considered as an appropriate
option. The lower bound is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2 (`2-norm Criterion for Assessment) For any  ≤ O(1), if there is a (r,DMR, ‖ ·
‖2, )-robust randomized smoothing mechanismM(x) = x+ z such that
E[‖ z ‖∞] = EM‖M(x)− x ‖∞ ≤ α, (7)
for some α ≤ O(1), then it must be true that α ≥ Ω( r√

). In another word, Ω( r√

) is the lower
bound of the expected magnitude of the random noise, i.e., the criterion.
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Theorem 4.2 indicates that the expected magnitude of the additive noise should be at least Ω( r√

)
to certify (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖2, )-robustness. For the Gaussian mechanism, the expected magnitude is
O(σ
√
log d) according to [25], which is O( r√

√
log d) to guarantee (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖2, )-robustness,
according to Theorem 4.1. This means that the gap between the Gaussian mechanism and the optimal
mechanism is bounded by O(
√
log d).
Remark 1 We say Gaussian mechanism is an appropriate option because O(
√
log d) is small for
most commonly-used datasets. For instance, for CIFAR-10 (d = 3072),
√
log d ≈ 2.83, and for
ImageNet (d = 150528),
√
log d ≈ 3.45.
Equivalently, if we fix the expected `∞-norm of the added noise as α, the largest radius r that
can be certified by any (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖2, )-robust randomized smoothing mechanisms is upper
bounded by O(α
√
), and the robust radius certified by Gaussian mechanism is O( α
√
√
log d
). The upper
bound O(α
√
) can be simply derived by transforming α ≥ Ω( r√

) in Theorem 4.2. For Gaussian
mechanism, since α = O(σ
√
log d) and  =
√
r2
2σ2 according to Theorem 4.1, r = O(
α
√
√
log d
).
5 Assessing Mechanisms for Certifying `∞-norm Robustness
In this section, we first discuss the possibility of using the Exponential mechanism, an analogue of the
Gaussian mechanism in the `∞-norm case, to certify `∞-norm robustness. Then, we prove the lower
bound on the magnitude of the noise required by all the randomized mechanisms to certify `∞-norm
robustness. By comparing the magnitude of the noise required by the Exponential mechanism with
the lower bound, we conclude that the Exponential mechanism is not an appropriate option to certify
`∞-norm robustness. Surprisingly, we find that the Gaussian mechanism is a more appropriate option
than the Exponential mechanism to certify `∞-norm robustness.
We first recall the form of the density function of Gaussian noise: p(z) ∝ exp(−‖ z ‖22σ2 ). Based on this,
we conjecture that, to certify `∞-norm robustness, we can sample the noise using the Exponential
mechanism, an analogue of the Gaussian mechanism in the `∞-norm case:
p(z) ∝ exp (−‖ z ‖∞
σ
). (8)
We show in the following theorem that randomized smoothing using the Exponential mechanism
can certify (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖∞, r22σ2 )-robustness, which is seemingly an extension of the `2-norm case.
However, the certified radius r is O(1/d), which implies that it is unscalable to high-dimensional
data, i.e., The Exponential mechanism should not be an appropriate mechanism to certify `∞-norm
robustness. This conclusion is further verified by our assessment method, which will be detailed later.
Theorem 5.1 (Exponential Mechanism for Certifying `∞-norm Robustness) Let f be any deter-
ministic classifier and g(x) = f(x+ z) be its corresponding randomized classifier for samples
x ∈ Rd, where the noise z is sampled from Exponential mechanism. Then, g(·) is (r,DMR, ‖·‖∞, rσ )-
robust and also (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖∞, r22σ2 )-robust.
According to Theorem 3.2, if we substitute  with rσ or
r2
2σ2 , then r can be given by r ≤ supα>1 −
σ
α log (1− p(1) − p(2) + 2( 12 (p1−α(1) + p1−α(2) ))
1
1−α ), or r2 ≤ supα>1 − 2σ2α log(1 − p(1) − p(2) +
2( 12 (p
1−α
(1) + p
1−α
(2) ))
1
1−α ). Comparing this result and Theorem 4.1, we can see that randomized
smoothing via the Exponential mechanism certifies a region with (almost) the same radius as that
certified by the Gaussian mechanism in the `2-norm case, indicating similarity in their robustness
guarantees. However, the following corollary shows that the magnitude of the noise required by the
Exponential mechanism is much larger than that of the Gaussian mechanism in the `2-norm case.
Corollary 2 For the Exponential mechanism that can guarantee Theorem 5.1, the following holds
Ez[‖ z ‖∞] = dσ. (9)
Corollary 2 indicates that the Exponential mechanism requires noise with magnitude O(d) to certify
`∞-norm robustness, which should be far from an appropriate option for high-dimensional datasets
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like ImageNet (d = 150528). The following theorem further verifies that there is indeed a huge gap
between the noise required by the Exponential mechanism and the lower bound.
Theorem 5.2 (`∞-norm Criterion for Assessment) For any (r,DMR, ‖·‖∞, )-robust mechanism
M(x) = x+ z that satisfies
E[‖ z ‖∞] = EM‖M(x)− x ‖∞ ≤ α,
it must be true that α ≥ Ω( r
√
d√

). In another word, Ω( r
√
d√

) is the lower bound of the expected
magnitude of the required noise, i.e., the criterion.
From Corollary 2 and Theorem 5.2, we can see that the gap between the noise required by the
Exponential mechanism O(d) and the lower bound Ω( r
√
d√

) is O(
√
d), which can be very large for
high-dimensional datasets. Therefore, we can conclude that the Exponential mechanism is not an
appropriate mechanism for certifying `∞-norm robustness. Surprisingly, the following theorem shows
that the Gaussian mechanism is an appropriate choice for certifying (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖∞, )-robustness.
Theorem 5.3 (Gaussian Mechanism for Certifying `∞-norm robustness) Let r,  > 0 be some
fixed number andM(x) = x+ z with z ∼ N (0, dr22 Id). Then,M(·) is (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖∞, )-robust,
and E[‖ z ‖∞] = EM‖M(x)− x ‖∞ is upper bounded by O( r
√
d log d√

).
From Theorem 5.2 and 5.3, we can see that the gap between the magnitude of the noise required
by the Gaussian mechanism to certify (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖∞, )-robustness and the lower bound is also
O(
√
log d). Thus, we can say the Gaussian mechanism is a more appropriate option to certify
`∞-norm robustness (see Remark 1).
6 Experiments
Datasets and Models Our theories and analysis are verified on two widely-used datasets, i.e.,
CIFAR10 and ImageNet†. We use a 110-layer residual network and the classical ResNet-50 as the
base models for CIFAR10 and ImageNet, respectively. Note that it is difficult for the models to
classify noisy images without seeing any noisy samples in the training stage. Thus, we train all the
models by adding appropriate Gaussian noise on the training images. The certified accuracy for
radius R is defined as the fraction of the test set whose certified radii are larger than R and predictions
are correct. We provide more details about the numerical methods in the supplementary material.
We note that the lower bounds are not verifiable by experiments since we are still not sure if there
exist any mechanism that can achieve those lower bound. So in the experiments, we only verify the
theoretical results regarding the Gaussian mechanism and the Exponential mechanism in this paper.
Empirical Results In the following, we verify our framework by comparing our theoretical results
on the scales of the robust radii with the radii at which the Gaussian/Exponential mechanism can
certify 50% accuracy. Note that in the previous literature, 50% model accuracy on adversarial
examples is considered as a fairly good performance [26, 11]. Besides, selecting another accuracy,
e.g., from 40 ∼ 60%, does not affect the verification results too much because what our theoretical
results characterize are the asymptotic behaviors not the exact values of the robust radii. In Fig. 1 & 2,
we demonstrate the certified results of the Gaussian mechanism. In the `2-norm case, Fig. 1 shows
that the Gaussian mechanism can certify approximately 50% accuracy at `2 radius = 0.34 (CIFAR-
10, d = 3072) and `2 radius = 0.29 (ImageNet, d = 150568), i.e., approximately 1/
√
log d,
which verifies that the `2 robust radius certified by Gaussian mechanism is O(
α
√
√
log d
)‡. We note that,
O( α
√
√
log d
) is the scale of the largest certified `2 radius (i.e., σ2 (Φ())) achieved by the previous literature
(α ∼ O(σ√log d)). In the `∞-norm case, Fig. 2 shows that the Gaussian mechanism certifies
approximately 50% accuracy at `∞ radius = 9e−3 (CIFAR-10, d = 3072) and `∞ radius = 1.4e−3
(ImageNet, d=150568), i.e., approximately O(1/
√
d log d), which verifies that the `∞ radius certified
by the Gaussian mechanism is O(
√
α√
d log d
). It is worth noting that the performance of the Gaussian
mechanism can be better with the bound proved in [11], which is even comparable to if not better
than the other approaches introduced in Section 2.
†Pixel value range is [0.0, 1.0]
‡α ≤ O(1), and  ≤ O(1).
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Figure 1: Certified accuracy for CIFAR-10 (top) and ImageNet (bottom) in `2 norm. The Gaussian
mechanism with different σ is used to certify robustness.
Figure 2: Certified accuracy (lower bound) for CIFAR-10 (top) and ImageNet (bottom) in `∞ norm.
The Gaussian mechanism with different σ is used to certify robustness.
In Fig. 3, we demonstrate the performance of the Exponential mechanism. As shown in Fig. 3, the
Exponential mechanism certifies approximately 50% accuracy at `∞ radius = 3e− 4 (CIFAR-10,
d=) and `∞ radius = 7e − 6 (ImageNet), i.e., approximately O(1/d), which verifies that the `∞
robust radius certified by the Exponential mechanism is O( α
√
√
log d
). Also, comparing Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3, we can see that the Gaussian mechanism is obviously more appropriate than the Exponential
mechanism for certifying `∞-norm robustness.
Figure 3: Certified accuracy for CIFAR-10 (top) and ImageNet (bottom) in `∞ norm. The Exponential
mechanism is used to certify robustness. Note that since the dimensionality d of CIFAR-10 is different
from that of ImageNet, we apply different σ to CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, according to Theorem 2.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a generic and self-contained framework, which connects the existing
frameworks such as [1, 2], for assessing randomized mechanisms. Under our framework, we define
the magnitude of the noise required by a randomized mechanism to certify a certain extent of
robustness as the metric for assessing this mechanism. We also provide the lower bounds on the
magnitudes of the required noise as the assessment criteria. Comparing the noise required by the
Gaussian and Exponential mechanism and the criteria, we conclude that (i) The Gaussian mechanism
is an appropriate option to certify `2-norm and `∞-norm robustness. (ii) The Exponential mechanism
is not an appropriate mechanism to certify `∞-norm robustness, although it seems an analogue of the
Gaussian mechanism in the `∞-norm case.
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A Omitted Proof
Proof [Proof of Theorem 3.1] According to Definition 3, we have ∀x′ ∈ Bp(x, r), Dα(A(x)||A(x′)) < α.
Therefore, A(·) satisfies (α, α)-RDP. According to the following lemma, i.e.,
Lemma 4 ([27]) If a randomized mechanism is (α, )-RDP, then it is (+ log(1/δ)
α−1 , δ)-DP,
A(·) is (α + log(1/δ)
1−α , δ)-DP, for all α ∈ (1,+∞). Since minα∈(1,+∞){α + log(1/δ)/(α − 1)}
β=α−1
=
minβ∈(0,∞){(1 + β + log(1/δ)β )} = + 2
√
log (1/δ), A(·) is (+ 2√log (1/δ), δ) Pixel-DP (DP).
Proof [Proof of Theorem 3.2] Lemma 2 indicates that argmaxy P (g(x) = y) = argmaxy′ P (g(x
′) = y′)
as long as Dα(g(x)||g(x′)) < − log (1− p(1) − p(2) + 2( 12 (p1−α(1) + p1−α(2) ))
1
1−α ). Since g(·) is
(r,DMR, ‖ · ‖p, )-robust, Dα(g(x)||g(x′)) < α. Thus, the above condition can be restated as
 ≤ supα>1− 1α log (1− p(1) − p(2) + 2( 12 (p1−α(1) + p1−α(2) ))
1
1−α )
Proof [Proof of Theorem 4.2] We consider a special case: let {x1,x2, · · · ,x2d} = {0, r√d}
d. Since for all
xi,xj , i, j ∈ [2d], ‖xi−xj ‖2 ≤ r,M is (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖2, )-robust on {0, r√
d
}d. According to Theorem 3.1,
M is also (+ 2√log (1/δ), δ)-PixelDP (DP).
Let us first connect the lower bound of one-way marginal (i.e., mean estimation) with the lower bound studied
in Theorem 4.2. Suppose an n-size dataset X ∈ Rn×d, the one-way marginal is h(D) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 Xi, where
Xi is the i-th row of X . In particular, when n = 1, one-way marginal is just the data point itself, and thus, the
condition in Theorem 4.2 can be rewritten as
EM‖M(D)− h(D)‖∞ ≤ α. (10)
Based on this connection, we first prove the case where r =
√
d, and then generalize it to any r. For r =
√
d,
the conclusion reduces to α ≥ Ω(
√
d

). To prove this, we employ the following lemma, which provides a
one-way margin estimation for all DP mechanisms.
Lemma 5 (Theorem 1.1 in [28]) For every  ≤ O(1), every 2−Ω(n) ≤ δ ≤ 1
n1+Ω(1)
and every α ≤ 1
10
, if
M : ({0, 1}d)n 7→ [0, 1]d is (, δ)-DP and E[‖A(D)− h(D)‖∞] ≤ α, then n ≥ Ω(
√
d log 1
δ
α
).
Setting n = 1,  =  + 2
√
 log 1
δ
in Lemma 5, we can see that if E[‖M(x) − x ‖∞] ≤ α, then 1 ≥
Ω(
√
d log 1
δ
(+2
√
 log 1
δ
)α
) ≥ Ω(
√
d√
α2
), where the last inequality is due to the fact that
√
log 1
δ
+2
√
 log 1
δ
≥ Ω( 1√

), since
 ≤ O(1). Therefore, we have the following theorem,
Theorem A.1 If a (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖2, )-robust randomized smoothing mechanismM satisfies that for all x ∈
{0, 1}d
E‖M(x)− x ‖∞ ≤ α, (11)
then 1 ≥ Ω(
√
d
α2
).
Now we come back to the proof for any r. If M satisfies EM‖M(xi) − xi ‖∞ ≤ α, then we have
EM‖
√
d
r
M(xi)−
√
d
r
xi ‖∞ ≤
√
d
r
α. SinceM is ( + 2√log (1/δ), δ)-PixelDP (DP) on [0, r√
d
]d,
√
d
r
M
is (+ 2
√
log (1/δ), δ)-PixelDP (DP) on [0, 1]d. By Theorem A.1 with α =
√
d
r
α ≤ O(1), we have
1 ≥ Ω( r√
α2
), i.e., α ≥ Ω( r√

). (12)
Proof [Proof of Theorem 5.1] We first prove that D∞(g(x)‖g(x′)) < rσ for all x′ ∈ B∞(x, r). Since
‖x′−x ‖∞ ≤ r, for any y,
p(y−x)
p(y−x′) =
exp(− ‖y−x ‖∞
σ
)
exp(− ‖y−x′ ‖∞
σ
)
≤ exp(‖y−x
′ ‖∞ − ‖y−x ‖∞
σ
) ≤ exp(‖x
′−x ‖∞
σ
) ≤ exp( r
σ
).
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Since Dα(g(x)‖g(x′)) < D∞(g(x)‖g(x′)) < rσ < rσα, ∀α ∈ (1,+∞), g(·) is (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖∞, rσ )-robust.
Also, based on the following lemma,
Lemma 6 ([29]) Let P and Q be two probability distributions satisfying D∞(P‖Q) ≤  and D∞(Q‖P ) ≤ .
Then, Dα(P‖Q) ≤ 12 2α,
we have Dα(g(x)‖g(x′)) ≤ 12 ( rσ )2α, i.e., g(·) is (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖∞, r
2
2σ2
)-robust.
Proof [Proof of Corollary 2] Define the distribution D on [0,∞) to be Z ∼ D, meaning Z = ‖ z ‖∞ for
z ∼ p(z), where p(z) is defined in Eq. 8. The probability density function of D is given by
pD(Z) ∝ Zd−1 exp(−Z
σ
),
which is obtained by integrating the probability density function in Eq. 8 over the infinity ball of radius Z with
surface area d2dZd−1 ∝ Zd−1. pD is the Gamma distribution with shape d and mean σ, and thus E[z] = dσ.
Proof [Proof of Theorem 5.2] The proof is almost the same as that of Theorem 4.2. Assume that we have a set
of data points X = {x1,x2 · · · ,x2d} = {0, r}d. Since ‖xi−xj ‖∞ ≤ r, is (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖2, )-robust on
{0, r√
d
}d. According to Theorem 3.1,M is also (+ 2√log (1/δ), δ)-PixelDP (DP). Thus, if
E[‖A(x)− x ‖∞] ≤ α,
then
E[‖1
r
A(x)− 1
r
x ‖∞] ≤ 1
r
α.
This means that 1
r
A(x) is ( + 2√log (1/δ), δ)-PixelDP (DP). Then, if we set n = 1,  =
 + 2
√
 log 1
δ
, and α = 1
r
α in Lemma 5, we can get 1 ≥ Ω(
√
dr2
α2
) by a similar proof as that of
Theorem 4.2.
Proof [Proof of Theorem 5.3] Dα(N (x, dr22 Id)‖N (x′, dr
2
2
Id)) =
α‖x−x′ ‖22
dr2
≤ αd‖x−x′ ‖2∞
dr2
≤ α.
Therefore,M(x) = x+ z with z ∼ N (0, dr2
2
Id) is (r,DMR, ‖ · ‖∞, )-robust. The bound of E[‖z‖∞] can
be easily proved by substituting σ in O(σ
√
log d) ([25]) with
√
dr2
2
.
B Additional Details
We first detail the numerical method for the experiments in the following. The certification algorithm is
first detailed in Alg. 1. Here we highlight the sampling method for the Exponential mechanism. Due to the
Algorithm 1 Certifying `2/`∞-norm Robustness
Require: Input x, a classifier f(·), parameter σ > 0, number of samples for estimating confidence
interval n.
Sample n samples from the Gaussian/Exponential mechanism {zi}i=1...n
Output ci = f(x+ zi), and estimate the distribution of ci, i.e., pj =
#{ci=j}i=1...n
n
if Choose the Gaussian mechanism then
Compute the robust radius by r2 = supα>1(− 2σ2α log (1− p1 − p2 + 2( 12 (p1−α1 + p1−α2 ))
1
1−α ))
1
2
else if Choose the Exponential mechanism then
ra = supα>1 − 2σ2α log (1− p1 − p2 + 2( 12 (p1−α1 + p1−α2 ))
1
1−α )
rb = supα>1(− 2σ2α log(1− p(1) − p(2) + 2( 12 (p1−α(1) + p1−α(2) ))
1
1−α ))
1
2
r∞ = max{ra, rb}
end if
For the Gaussian mechanism, `2 robust radius is r2, and `∞ robust radius is
√
r22/d. For the
Exponential mechanism, `∞ robust radius is r∞.
high dimensionality of samples in real world applications, directly sampling z ∼ p(z) as in Eq. 8 by the
12
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm requires a large number of random-walks that can incur high
computational cost. To alleviate this issue, we adopt an efficient sampling method from [30] that first samples
R from Gamma(d + 1, σ) and then samples z from [−R,R]d uniformly. The complexity of this sampling
algorithm is only O(d).
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